Regional Integration is Impractical

(Published in Stabroek News' letter pages on February 27, 2011)

I feel compelled to write this letter as our leaders are once again gathering in Grenada this weekend to discuss regional integration. Also, I’m partially motivated by your constant supportive editorial positions of the regional integration attempt widely known as Caricom.  The emphasis is on ‘attempt,’ because the mere signing of a treaty does not establish integration. It symbolises a promise by leaders to enact a plan in trying to unify their respective economies. True integration only can be achieved through genuine, substantive implementation of this promise.

The Caricom promise is premised on ‘three pillars’ of cooperation in the economic, functional, and foreign policy areas. While there has been some successful movement in the area of functional cooperation, the other areas can be best characterised as stagnant or in deep hibernation.

Most of the blame for the failure of fulfilling the integration promise has been attributed to the lack of ‘political will’ among the region’s heads of states.  For nearly 40 years now, leaders have shouldered the primary share of blame for making the rules on one hand and for breaking the rules on the other which effectively derail any serious attempt at implementation.

However, this criticism is overly simplistic. Few scholars, policy-makers or proponents of integration in the region have attempted to show the impracticality of Caricom integration efforts. Moreover, an unjustified sense of idolizing worship has been attached to this dream of the region’s natural unity so any attempts to criticise it are seen as nearly blasphemous.

While the nations’ leaders are accused of subverting and sabotaging the process, no such aspersions are cast on the region’s voters for not holding their elected officials accountable for a process that would clearly improve (at least as argued by proponents) their well-being and economic circumstances. Why have we not seen a more active, urgent civil discourse across the region that would alert, alarm, and ignite our governments to become serious about integration? In the case of the Caricom Single Market and Economy (CSME), why have we not seen our private sector up in arms over the slow pace of regional integration as one of the most glaring constraining barriers in its potential development?

Part of the answer lies in the realist notion that international politics is conducted in an arena of conflicting state interests, and that states are led by humans, who are by nature self-centred, self-interested and distrustful of others. Furthermore, nations – and by extension, its citizens – have an interest, at a minimum, in their own security and survival.  Throughout many years, we have seen many examples of this being played out across the region – from Ralph Gonsalves’ criticism of Trinidad and Tobago and Caribbean Airlines over the Liat Airline to the T &T Prime Minister’s assertion that the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is not a priority but instead domestic issues like crime and flooding should be.

Other examples include the uproar in Guyana over Ansa McAl’s takeover attempt of Banks DIH and Trinidad and Tobago’s announcement that it will no longer be the region’s ‘godfather’ and any storm-affected countries will not receive non-reciprocated support. Still others include the appalling treatment of Guyanese nationals at airports in the region as well as Guyana and Jamaica, for example, breaching the Common External Tariff (CET) to source cement and rice respectively from external sources. Yet another is the signing of the PetroCaribe agreement despite Trinidad and Tobago’s objections.  Unfortunately, there are still other examples indicating how our instincts turn inwards in the face of a perceived threat or limited national value, which only serve to delay and diminish the prospects of real sustainable development and growth.

Other regional integration movements – most notably, the European Union (EU) – have been able to move beyond self-interest and cooperate on many issues and levels. One explanation for our collective shortcomings might be that Caricom member countries do not constitute significant export markets for trade with each other (intra-regional trade) and, therefore, are more dependent on trade with the developed world. The average intra-regional trade as a fraction of total trade has been a relatively measly 13 per cent with the ‘more developed countries’ of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana and Barbados accounting for around 94 per cent of all intra-regional trade.  This situation creates few incentives to cooperate and makes it that much more important to reduce barriers with the first world, where the majority of trade is conducted.  In the EU, intra-regional represents some 75 per cent of all trade.

Another reason for the current stalemate in making progress toward regional integration lies in the fact that while there was a desire for economic integration through the CSME there was little motivation to achieve political integration.  In fact, the expert and scholarly literature argues consistently that an ‘economic demand’ for integration must be complemented – or preceded – by a ‘political supply’ of institutions to achieve this. In the EU, there is the European Council and Parliament where all decisions are debated and enacted along with a European Commission with the mandate to implement and ensure compliance.

In Caricom’s case, there are the heads of government meetings as well as the ceremonial and public relations agency known as the Caricom Secretariat, which has no real authority to ensure compliance.  Moreover, the lack of a hegemonic or ‘big power’ to facilitate and drive enforcement of agreements and promises is a major limitation in Caricom integration efforts. The EU has Germany, Africa has South Africa, Latin America has Brazil and Asia has China.

The cost of and reliance on external support from donor agencies also make regional integration improbable and subject to the whims and fancies of external forces who can dictate the pace at which any efforts would move forward. Our countries do not have the financial capacity to justify an investment of the magnitude involved in integrating our economies. There are so many dimensions that require enormous funding to make Caricom a reality and this does not include the establishment of the necessary institutions. In fact, Norman Girvan has identified 17 just for CSME purposes in his ‘single development vision’ paper. Take for instance the massive costs associated with upgrading and modernising our transport infrastructure across the region and the recent revelations that the Caricom Community will be adopting “belt tightening measures” by reducing the budgetary allocation of the secretariat and other associated institutions.

Moreover, if the CSME provisions were to be implemented, numerous problems would arise across the region.  First, they would restrict the government’s ability to implement context-specific and country-specific economic development strategies. Caricom, in effect, becomes a nation-state with individual countries reduced to the status of federal provinces. Moreover, the process assumes some sort of homogeneous reality across the region and that harmonisation of economic sectors, fiscal, monetary and taxation policy is achievable.

Any person with even a rudimentary knowledge of economics would see that this creates uneven benefits to some at the expense of others. For instance, a single tax system would increase tax rates in some countries while reducing it in others. Tax reductions would have enormous implications on national revenues in countries like Guyana with high tax rates and would increase the cost of living for countries that previously had lower rates. Both instances have welfare-reducing effects on a nation’s population. Similarly, a single currency would mean that countries like Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago would see the value of their national currency diminish, causing imports to become expensive. Meanwhile, countries like Guyana and Suriname would see the value of their currency appreciate, causing local produce and exports to be more expensive for overseas purchases, thus reducing trade volume.

A second disturbing dimension of the CSME is the fact that it exacerbates and institutionalises trade diversion and trade suppression. That is, replacing cheaper imports from non-member Caricom countries by higher-cost domestic producers, which is already occurring under the common external tariff (CET). Trade diversion reduces a country’s economic welfare and citizens do not benefit from the cheapest available price of goods. Only a global union can avoid all trade diversion. Therefore, unilateral tariff elimination with all countries will lead to greater trade creation without giving rise to trade diversion.

Proponents of regionalism view globalisation and trade liberalisation as an evil to be feared by individual nations in the Caribbean, which thwarts the imperative for collaborative efforts that would respond to this threat.  But the reality does not show this, at least in the case of Guyana.  A cursory historical look at our experiment with closed off and import substitution policies in the 1970s and 1980s shows that our economy regressed and stagnated. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Guyana adopted trade liberalisation policies as a result of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), Guyana’s economy grew at an average annual rate of seven per cent.

These growth rates probably would have continued if not for domestic political unrest that stymied the process in 1997. Furthermore, and despite non-integration, Guyana’s economy – as well as those of other Caribbean territories – is still recording growth. From all of this, one can conclude that the real evil or threat is not globalisation but rather the aggregate of domestic issues and policies. Instead of looking toward a regional solution, Caribbean countries should examine their own national realities in order to best take advantage of the opportunities afforded by globalisation.

Implement Regulations for Real Estate Agents

I recently had an unpleasant experience with a real estate agent who has his name and contact information on almost every property up for sale in Guyana.

This agent approached me about a number of properties he had in his portfolio to sell and agreed to show personally a few of them.  A few days later, I sent an e-mail expressing my interest in one of the properties, making an offer to purchase it at a price I believed to be mutually comfortable for both the buyer’s and seller’s interests.

A few days later, I received a response indicating that the owner had accepted my offer. Subsequently, I requested a written letter of acceptance and intent to sell the said property, which was agreed to and fulfilled a few days later. After touring the property once more, I indicated to the agent that I would contact the bank for a mortgage to purchase which would entail a lot of bank prerequisites taking up a good deal of my time, energy and financial resources. I was looking for a clear assurance – which the agent provided – that the prospective property sale would proceed earnestly with the owner’s intentions as stated.

Several weeks passed. My mortgage application was approved and I received a call from my agent indicating that the owner had arrived in the country and was ready to proceed with the signing of the agreement of sale. We agreed on a date but on the morning of the proposed signing, I was unable to contact the agent. When I finally made contact with him, the agent said the owner was no longer interested in selling the property. The agent gave at least four conflicting versions of an explanation and it was difficult to pinpoint the actual reason for the agreement falling apart. After my repeated insistence, he confessed that the property had been sold to someone else.

I was flabbergasted understandably and was extremely disappointed considering all of the input that had been invested in this project. My attorney filed an injunction prohibiting the sale of the property and compelling the owner to honor his contractual obligation to sell the property as originally indicated. The matter is still receiving the Court’s attention and in a future column, I will provide an update on the outcome.

I relate this story because it should focus attention on an issue that will become increasingly critical as the nation’s economy grows – the regulation of real estate agents in Guyana. With such strong economic prospects, there is a pressing need for effective regulation of residential and commercial real estate brokerage services. As the volume of consumer expenditures for these services expand, so does the frequency of informal complaints and formal concerns about professional credibility.

In the absence of a regulatory body, a real estate commission, board, or authority with sanctioning power, there is no recourse, unless the person is willing to take the agent through tedious and expensive court proceedings. Otherwise, agents will have little or no motivation to operate differently, knowing that there are, at best, only limited repercussions for actions that should be seen normally in professional settings as unethical or blatantly dishonest, depending upon the circumstances involved.

Moreover, a comprehensive Real Estate Agents Act is required to promote and protect the interests of consumers with respect to transactions that relate to real estate and to promote public confidence in the performance of real estate agency work performance. One important feature of any such proposed legislation should be the requirement of being licensed to carry out the tasks involved. Another would be the establishment of an agency with clear authority to, among other responsibilities, develop rules of professional practice and sustain these rules for licensees. There would be a prescribed code of ethics along with a setting of fees and disciplinary levies for infractions of code requirements.

The agency also would be responsible for administering the licensing regime for agents, and ensuring that a register of licensees is established, kept, and maintained. Furthermore, it would provide grievance and relief procedures for the lodging of complaints and the protocol for investigating and initiating proceedings relative to offences covered under the Act.

Such regulation is standard in many nations, small and large. Guyana, with its growing real estate sector and concomitant corps of real estate agents, must recognize the importance that such an initiative would have on inspiring trust and confidence in both local and foreign consumers who are attracted with greater frequency to the real estate asset potential in the nation.

What’s playing out at the US Embassy?

(Published in Kaieteur News on August 17, 2008)

DEAR EDITOR,
The U.S. Embassy in Guyana should stop accepting applications for business and tourist non-immigrant visas if the current processing system is maintained.

In the past, an applicant for the abovementioned visas would have had to satisfy Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of the United States, and show that he or she has a permanent residence abroad (meaning in the applicant’s home country) which he/she has no intention of abandoning.

The “ties” to your country were determined by documentation(s) that was submitted and which showed family, social, employment, economic, or other ties to your country.

At present, the system has undergone a dramatic change, and the local embassy now has a group of highly trained visa scrutinizers whose skill set can rival any of the best psychics and clairvoyants the world over.

These scrutinizers, without any form of documented evidence, can reliably identify and accurately tell just by looking at an applicant and asking as many as two questions whether an applicant has ‘strong ties.’ When I first heard of this, I thought it was a big joke.

I subsequently confirmed, to my surprise and consternation, that it was wholly accurate. Is this the best the U.S. Government can do for folks who have to fork over US$131?

At the highest level, this is a discriminatory practice and is based on the assumption that all supporting documents are fraudulent and the Embassy has no way of verifying the authenticity (this is the US Government we are talking about!) of these documents.

What a slap in the face for our commercial banks and Government agencies which are responsible for issuing the documentation.

Even though the embassy’s speculation might be true in some cases, document fraud occurs in every part of the world (the U.S. included) and is not unique to Guyana; so, to abandon the system on the pretext of the impossibility of authenticating supporting documents is artificial. There are better methods of verifying these sorts of documents.

Maybe they might want to consider using one of those U.S. security experts who always come here to lecture us on proper security methods.

When I was issued my Business Visa in 2004 to travel to the U.S., I felt fairly treated and was given the opportunity to present supporting documents to show that I have every intention of returning to Guyana.

I can only speculate on what the outcome would be if I (or my other business colleagues) were to apply for a visa today, or what the outcome would be when I have to renew my current one.

I have to do my best physical performance (or you might call it acting) to convince the Visa Officer that I’m telling the truth.

Otherwise, If I don’t look ‘believable,’ or if I become nervous during the interview, the Visa Officer might interpret that to mean that I’m dishonest and don’t really have the ties I say I have.

This is a most ludicrous and outdated system being employed in this 21st century to conduct serious business. I would expect this sort of stuff from my sons’ kindergarten school, not the U.S. Government.

This is an example of the kinds of nonsensical action(s) and policy/policies that are being employed by U.S. Government agencies that have caused people of the world to question and discount the leadership and moral authority of the USA.

Clinton Urling

No One Need Fear a Currency War

(Published in Stabroek News' Letter Page on October 21, 2010)

Dear Editor,

After reading the article in your October 20 edition by Peter Apps titled, ‘The return of great power politics,’ I felt inclined to offer a response. Recently, the US has been vociferous in protesting China’s long-standing policy of deliberately devaluing its currency so as to make its products cheaper on the export markets. This policy has contributed to an enormous trade imbalance in favour of the Chinese, with the US, European and other countries. In response to the US’s discontent, the Chinese are reluctant to capitulate to the demands because of fears such a move would have on its primary driver of economic growth over the past decade – its exports.

Using a complex economic model, Harvard Political-Economy Professor, Dani Rodrik, estimated in 2009 that China’s currency is undervalued by some twenty-five per cent, and if corrected by appreciation, Chinese economic growth would diminish by approximately 2.1 percentage points. Not much considering China’s growth averages just above ten per cent. The Chinese are taking advantage of a loophole in global trading arrangements and seem to be buying time for the inevitable relaxing of its current policy of devaluation. This is the only logical course that China can follow because of the interdependency of the global trading system and its reliance on income from its main trading partner, the US and Europe. Similarly, the US is entangled in this global trading web and depends on the cheap Chinese imports to satisfy a consuming populace that is struggling through a recession (which by the way has little to do with Chinese policy). Furthermore, China was (is) the principal lender to the US during the economic calamity that engulfed its economy.  For both countries, despite the tough rhetoric and political posturing, only cooperation and agreement is possible going forward.

This brings me back to the said article, and many of the like that have appeared in the mainstream media the past few days, and the use of explosive words and phrases with zero-sum connotations, like “power politics” and “currency war.” This is just another example of how the media can frame a dialogue to induce fear and create artificial conflicts to sell their content.

Let us not be hoodwinked by this ruse; there is no currency war for anyone to fear, just rumblings that in the end would be resolved to ensure the current trading system remains intact.

Yours faithfully,
Clinton Urling

What Will the president Do If His Consultations With Stakeholders on the EPA Reveal Dissatisfaction?

(Published in Stabroek News' Letter Pages on July 11, 2008)

Dear Editor,

I have to disagree with President Bharrat Jagdeo’s position as it relates to the signing/non-signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

The negotiations of the EPA took place on three levels: ministerial, principal negotiators and subject-specific negotiators.  Dame Billie Miller, Senior Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade-Barbados, led the negotiations on the ministerial side of things while Director General of the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) Dr Richard Bernal served as the Principal Negotiator.  The subject-specific issues were conducted by members of the EPA College of Negotiators. The Caribbean negotiating team comprised some of the finest minds in the Caribbean on international trade issues and were tasked with the responsibilities of “forging an agreement on the structure of an EPA, consolidating the outcome of discussions on the priority issues for Cariforum regional integration, and agreeing on an approach to trade liberalization” (source: CRNM).

Since 2004 and after three years, the Cariforum EPA negotiations were finally completed in December of last year. At that time Dr Richard Bernal had said: “This is a momentous and proud achievement for the region. Our success in completing this agreement, though hard won, has secured opportunity for trade expansion, economic development and the improvement of the welfare of the Cariforum people. What we have attained within this agreement is unprecedented within the region.

“Certainly, the Cariforum region is the only of the six negotiating ACP groups to successfully complete a comprehensive EPA with Europe. The stewardship of the heads and the active, robust participation of our region’s stakeholders, including the technicians, the private sector, the officials and civil society have made this possible.” (Source: CRNM)

There is no doubt in my mind about the hard work put in by the negotiators and I must applaud the outstanding job they did. The RNM got the best agreement they could out of the negotiations. As with any integration movement, with many sovereign nations involved, each member state is not going to receive whatever demands it requested. Even during the negotiations, concessions are as common as the sunrise is in the morning, and negotiators often have to compromise to arrive at win-win situations for all parties concerned. Moreover, member states cannot subscribe and fully endorse a process (the RNM) and then when some aspect of their individual preference does not pan out, they cry foul; it is just undiplomatic and betrays the whole spirit of the integration movement.

It is also baffling why the President took so long to object to the contents of the agreement and why did he delay for such an extended period his decision to engage in consultations with local stakeholders before signing the agreement. Even before the completion of the EPA negotiations in December, the government must have received information flows as to what the draft and final outcome of the negotiated agreement was going to look like and should have taken steps immediately to address its concerns.

Regardless of the answers to those questions, the President has said that consultations will begin. What if those consultations reveal dissatisfaction with the EPA? What does the President do next? Refuse to sign on with the rest of his Caricom brothers? Come up with some new negotiating arrangement to engage directly with the European Union? Or will he just be satisfied with the fact that history’s footnote will record that he made a bold objection to the agreement? I don’t have the answers but I would surely love to have a response from the President on this one.

Yours faithfully,
Clinton Urling

How Would Opponents of the EPA Have Achieved What they Wanted in Negotiations With the EU?

(Published in Stabroek News' Letter pages on July 13, 2008)

Dear Editor,

I find it amazing how the European Union (EU) is being portrayed as the nemesis in the present debate about the EPA and the doing away of the Sugar Protocol. We seem to forget that we in the Caribbean sealed our fate when we signed on to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and embraced the ideological concept of global market liberalization (or so-called free markets). Signing on to the WTO implied that we were ready to remove all administrative and regulatory encumbrances to global trade and “ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible” (WTO mission statement). It should not be surprising then that in 2003, Brazil, Australia and Thailand announced their intent to challenge EU sugar subsidies at the WTO. These three nations attacked the EU sugar policy claiming that it unfairly favoured raw sugar imports from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations and that the EU sugar export quota and subsidy system violated WTO rules and unfairly supported European sugar exports.
When this challenge was issued the EU trade representatives at the time responded critically and warned that such a challenge would hurt developing countries. In fact, then EU Agriculture Commissioner, Mr Franz Fischler was quoted as saying that, “this challenge is hard to understand. It is nothing less than an attack on the EU’s trade preferences for developing countries. Let us be clear. The claims made by Brazil, Australia and Thailand risk undermining the benefits of the EU regime for many sugar-dependant developing countries, especially ACP countries. And to add insult to injury, they are challenging the commitments which were agreed upon by all WTO members during the Uruguay Round and which are fully respected by the EU.”

The EU wasn’t alone in voicing its concerns; the ACP countries, recognizing that an unfavourable ruling against the EU would have repercussions to the existing sugar protocol, came forward and also expressed their strong opposition to the Brazilian, Australian and Thai action. In the end, those protests didn’t matter at all in the grand scheme of things. No one could have realistically expected the chief free-trade establishment (the WTO) to side with the Europeans and on April 28, 2005, the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body upheld its judgment that EU sugar policies were illegal and should be dismantled by 2006. One surprising aspect of the Appellate Body’s ruling was their opinion that there were no linkages between EU export subsidies and the access afforded to ACP sugar quota holders, and that implementation of the rulings would not require any change to the existing arrangements (including the preferential system) with those ACP members. How could this be? How could the WTO espouse trade liberalization and fairness as the most important component of its mandate yet still argue that a preferential trade system where artificial prices are paid to some (excluding others) could somehow be maintained. Let’s say the EU had decided not to scrap the preferential arrangement, then that would have left the EU vulnerable to a challenge from another country or group of countries challenging the legality and fairness of the system. Believe me, had the EU not taken steps to abolish the preferential system, some other country(s) would have made a challenge to the WTO for its abolishment; after all countries will fight to protect their own interests.

In the light of Article 300(7) of the treaty establishing the European Community which binds the institutions of the EU and their member states to observe the EU’s international treaty commitments (which meant respecting and implementing the WTO’s ruling), and on the heels of the EU Common Agriculture Policy reforms, the European Commission went ahead with reforming the EU sugar regime.
There was absolutely no obligation (maybe except a moral one) on the part of the EU to extend any sort of developmental assistance to the ACP grouping. However, that was not the case and the EU proposed the concept of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with ACP countries

The EPA negotiations were to be executed within the framework of regional trading blocs. The Caribbean called its grouping Cariforum and agreed that the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) would negotiate on its behalf. The RNM did not work in isolation but rather consulted extensively with every possible stakeholder for three years and came up with what it believed to be the best agreement that could be had from the negotiations.

Now the opponents of the EPA are arguing that the RNM somehow got bullied and conceded to a bad deal. One critic, the highly respected Havelock Brewster, would rather us not view the EPA clauses “in terms of whether or not they conform to WTO rules, or whether or not they would have been negotiable with the EC,” but solely on their merits as development tools. Theoretical arguments are one thing but practical and pragmatic execution is another. How could the RNM not negotiate with the realities of the WTO and the interests of the EU being taken into consideration? It is downright preposterous to suggest otherwise.

I would like for the opponents of the EPA to tell me in real and pragmatic terms how they would have approached the negotiations with the EU and show me how they would have achieved what they wanted.
Moreover, tell me if they are questioning the competence and aptitude of the Cariforum negotiating mechanism?

Yours faithfully,
Clinton Urling

The EPA Has More Advantages Than Disadvantages for the Region

(Published in Kaieteur News on August 23, 2008)

DEAR EDITOR
Former Caribbean diplomat Sir Ronald Sanders is one of the most ardent and vociferous critics of the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). In his Sunday column in the Kaieteur News titled, “EPA for whose benefit?”

Mr. Saunders starts out by warning readers that if the EPA is to be signed in its present form, Cariforum states run the risk of becoming “plantations economies” with large foreign owned and managed EU companies ruling the day and Caribbean people being reduced to lowly workers.

Somewhat surprisingly, Mr. Saunders then went on to contradict himself at the end of his column by stating: “The EPA will bring no new investment to the Caribbean.

Caribbean incentives to foreign direct investment (FDI) are already overly generous; European firms do not need an EPA to invest in the region.”

If the EPA will not result in new FDI, then how exactly is the plantation economy scenario supposed to play out?

Mr. Saunders ambivalence aside, since when is FDI in the region a bad idea? Taking an example from our local circumstances, could you imagine what our telecommunication sector would have looked like if it weren’t for GT&T and Digicel?

Could you even fathom where Guyana would be today if we had waited for a local company to emerge and provide the services of those two foreign owned companies?

There are many other examples where FDI has produced dramatic results in a particular sector(s) throughout the Caribbean.

Mr. Saunders highlighted the unequal strength of the EU as compared to that of individual Cariforum countries.

He mentioned the EU being a $12 trillion economy with about 350 million people and a size that is 88 times larger that all Cariforum states put together.

For him, that mathematics added up to total disaster for individual Caribbean states because of the vast asymmetry.

For me, I see this as presenting an enormous advantage for Cariforum states; Cariforum companies and service suppliers will have duty free quota free access to such a vast market, whereas, the EU will have to be contented with our small combined population and economies(and even smaller when taken individually).

Furthermore, the fact that most Caribbean territories are involved in the trade of services rather than that of goods, I find it difficult to envision a scenario where upon signing of the EPA, EU firms and professionals would want to flock the service sector in the region and have to compete with already established firms (many of which are foreign owned) for the small available market share.

Nonetheless, even if we were to see an influx of EU firms and professionals, it means that Cariforum consumers (visitors and locals) will have more available choices, better service and cheaper prices because of this new highly competitive landscape; for the tourism sector this will be a fortunate development.

Additionally, Mr. Saunders mentioned a point made by Professor Norman Girvan that if the EU is given duty free access to Cariforum, then other developed countries and Cariforum trading partners will want to have the same duty free access.

I want to remind Mr. Saunders that all Cariforum countries are members of the World Trade Organisation and agreed to trade liberalization as per the WTO’s mandate. Is this a surprising development?

In closing, I would posit to say that the EPA is not a perfect (made impossible by so many competing interests) arrangement, but has more advantages than disadvantages to the region based on observation.

However, I might change my view if official statistical data is made available showing the impact expected from the signing of the EPA.
Clinton Urling